The Losing Argument: Jocasta’s Empirical Epistemology and the Limits of Skepticism in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex

Jocasta's criticism of prophesy in the play is sometimes interpreted as either impiety or as the play's central argument that divine knowledge is superior to human reason. Both readings depend on a description of her argument that the Greek does not support. Instead of using the outdated vocabulary of empiricism, this article objectively reconstructs Jocasta's argument in those contemporary words and demonstrates how this alters the play's intended meaning. Applying the textual analytical approach of qualitative research methodology, the article argues that Jocasta’s argument loses not because observation is inferior to revelation but because an eikos argument is by its nature defeasible, and she treats a defeasible inference as a closed proof. It goes on to say that her second, more extreme stance - that chance reigns and nothing can be clearly predicted is a separate epistemology from her first, and that the true arc of her thinking is the shift from εκκň (eikos, "the likely") to εἰκῇ (eikē, "at random"). Findings reveal how the drama distributes evidence along gendered lines: Jocasta is given no opportunity to demand consent, that reinforces the assumption upon which the entire recognition hinges, and realizes the truth before Oedipus. The destruction of reason by prophecy is not her losing argument. It is Sophocles' demonstration that the only knowledge accessible to humans is inference from witness, which can be true, false, or valid.